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The Clandestine Negotiation of
Voluntary Restraints on Shoes
from Italy: An Augury of
Future Negotiations under the
Trade Reform Act of 1973?
RALPH OMAN*
On April 10, 1973, the Nixon Administration and the House Commit-
tee on Ways and Means under Chairman Mills unveiled the long-awaited
Trade Reform Act of 1973.1 Among its most controversial aspects is a
predilection for deference to the President's discretion.2 The normal safe-
* Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia; Diplome des Etudes 1961, Univer-
sity of Paris (Sorbonne); B.A. 1962, Hamilton College; J.D. 1973, Georgetown University.
1. H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
2. Section 103() grants the President advance authority to take such action as is
necessary to reduce "the burden on trade resulting from methods of customs valuation,
from establishing the quantities on which assessments are made, and from requirements
for marking of country of origin." The proposed legislation has aroused opposition in
Congress:
[T]he President has asked Congress for powers to make him a trade czar. He
seeks a transfer of unprecedented authority from the Capitol to the White
Trade Reform Act of 1973
guards on which the public relies to restrain executive whim or bad
judgment-open hearings and congressional debate-have atrophied
under the proposed legislation. Sections 112(a) and (b) of the Trade Re-
form Act 8 provide for diverse inputs as an aid to the executive prior to
the negotiation of new trade agreements, 4 but the legislation specifically
states that meetings with "selected industry, labor and agricultural
groups" be exempt "from the requirements relating to open meetings and
public participation... of the Federal Advisory Committee Act."5 The
official explanation, released by the Committee on Ways and Means,
maintained that "[o]pen meetings and public participation would com-
promise the U.S. negotiating posture with foreign countries and inhibit
the flow of information from the advisory groups to the President."
Doubtless, such disadvantages would flow from frank and open public
debate. Disadvantages, however, also attend secret negotiations, as wit-
nessed by the Administration's unhappy experience with the sale of wheat
to the Soviet Union.7 This episode might serve to sour the Administra-
tion's taste for secret negotiations and lead to an acknowledgement that
House. Once this power is surrendered, congressional changes in the law could
be stopped by the President, and one-third of the Congress plus one. In trade
matters, majority rule would be ended....
... This bill... would permit the President to arrange trade deals in
specific areas, for specific companies, and for special individuals. It would give
the President authority in trade matters to fatten his friends and destroy his
enemies.
I cannot give the White House authority to enter into secret and star-
chamber trade deals and then permit the dealers to shroud their action in
executive privilege.
Trade must be open-above-board and provide equal opportunities for all
American producers, large and small, who produce the same commodity. The
fairness doctrine must be enacted into the trade laws.
119 CONG. REc. H. 2594 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1973) (remarks of Congressman Vanik).
3. H.R. 6767, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
4. These include the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior,
Labor, State, Treasury, and the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. In addi-
tion, the President and the federal agencies are authorized to seek the advice of
"selected industry, labor, and agricultural groups." Id. § 112(a) and (b).
5. Id. § 112(b). The Federal Advisory Committee Act was passed on Oct. 6, 1972, in
an attempt to streamline the control and usefulness of the:
numerous committees, boards, commissions, councils, and similar groups which
have been established to advise officers and agencies in the executive branch of
the Federal Government... that ... are frequently a useful and beneficial
means of furnishing expert advice, ideas, and diverse opinions to the Federal
Government.
Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 App. I U.S.CA. § 2(a) (Cum. Annual Pocket Part
1973) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 6, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 1, 86 Stat. 770).
6. HousE COIM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93D CONG., Isr SEss., PREsS RELEASE AND OTHER
MATERIAL RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSAL ENrrLsD THE "TRADE REFORM
Acr or 1973" 69-70 (Comm. Print 1973).
7. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1973, § 1, at I, col. 6; see generally Note, Administrative
Survey: 1972, 5 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 493, 657 (1973).
Cornell International Law Journal
shared responsibility has its merits. When presented with a fait accom-
pli, Congress has a tendency to fault the achievement. If, on the other
hand, Congress and the public were involved in a meaningful way in the
negotiations the prospects of widespread support would be brighter.
Thus, in its deliberations on the Trade Reform Act of 1973, Congress
must weigh these considerations and must ask whether untidy public
discussions would be too costly a luxury in future negotiations with U.S.
trading partners. The subsequent discussion of the secret negotiations on
Italian shoe export limitations illuminates the problem and suggests an
answer to the dilemma posed by some aspects of the Trade Reform Act
of 1973.
I
BACKGROUND
In 1971, the United States suffered its first trade deficit since 1888,8 and
this dramatized the protectionist cries that had issued from many seg-
ments of the economy.9 The U.S. footwear industry was among the most
outspoken in calling for government intervention-in the form of higher
tariffs and quota restrictions-to protect the industry from rising im-
ports,10 particularly imports of nonrubber footwear from Italy.
In June of 1971, presumably in response to these domestic pressures,
President Richard Nixon dispatched Ambassador David Kennedy, the
former Secretary of the Treasury, to Europe to seek a means of correcting
the mounting U.S. international trade imbalance.l On the question of
footwear, the Ambassador had available for use two powerful tactical
weapons-the temporarily stalled Trade Act of 197012 and a Tariff Coin-
8. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 26, 1972, at 5, col. 2; Address by President Nixon, Nation-
wide Radio and Television, Aug. 15, 1971, in 65 DEP'T STATE BuIL. 253 (1971). In 1964,
the trade surplus totalled $7 billion; in 1971, the deficit totalled $2 billion. Hearings
on H.R. 14989 Before a Subcomm. on Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary and Related Agencies of the House Comm, on Appropriations, 92d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 3, at 359 (1973) (Statement of Harold B. Scott, Assistant Secretary of Com-
merce for Domestic and International Business).
9. The Trade Act of 1970, H.R. 18970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Trade Act of 1970], was one of the most significant manifestations of the growing
protectionist sentiment. The Act is popularly known as the Mills Bill, despite disclaim-
ers from its namesake.
10. Wall St. Journal, July 7, 1971, at 12, col. 2; Journal of Commerce, Jan. 31, 1972,
at 9, col. 4.
11. Journal of Commerce, July 9, 1971, at 1, col. 6.
12. The Trade Act of 1970, supra note 9. It was narrowly defeated in 1970 and re-
introduced in the second session as H.R. 20, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
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mission finding that gave the President broad powers to increase duties
on imported footwear.13
On August 21, 1970, the House Committee on Ways and Means issued
its report14 accompanying the Trade Act of 1970, and urged the imposi-
tion of quantitative restrictions, or quotas, on all imports of nonrubber
footwear.' 5 The import limitations were to take effect in 1971, and were
to be equal to the average quantity imported annually during the three
calendar years 1967 through 1969.16 For each of the subsequent five years,
the bill would limit increases in the total imports to five percent of the
total quantity permitted in the preceding year.'7
An important adjunct to this limitation was a provision authorizing
the President to negotiate agreements with foreign countries.' 8 This
statutory provision was aimed at the regulation of the offending imports. 9
Once an agreement on limitations was reached, the quotas imposed by
the bill would be lifted.20 Apparently encouraged by the success of the
"voluntary" export quotas arranged with foreign steel manufacturers, 2'
the authors of the Trade Act of 1970 felt that:
these provisions are designed to provide a mechanism for establishing a reason-
able and effective limitation on United States imports on . . . non-rubber
footwear products . . . . It is intended that, insofar as may be possible, the
limitation of these imports will be accomplished through the negotiation of
.. such agreements .... 22
Thus the President was given substantial discretion to negotiate either
formal agreements or informal arrangements2s "regulating by category
the quantities of . . . articles which may be exported to the United
States." 24 The bill appeared designed to prod the foreign governments
into adopting export controls similar to those arranged for steel.
During the period that the House Ways and Means Committee was
drafting its bill, the President, under the authority vested in him by sec-
13. U.S. TAmRw Com'N, PuB. No. 359, NoNiuBBn FoonVEAR (1971) [hereinafter cited
as NONRUBBER FooTWEARi.
14. H.R. REP. No. 1435, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (accompanying H.R. 18970) [herein-
after cited as H.R. REP. No. 1435].
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 85.
19. Id. at 86.
20. Id. at 35.
21. Letter from Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Wilbur Mills, Jan. 14, 1969, in 60
DEP'T STATE BULL. 93 (1969).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1435, supra note 14, at 36.
23. Id. at 40.
24. Trade Act of 1970, supra note 9, § 202(a).
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tion 301(b)(1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,25 had requested the
Tariff Commission to "make an investigation to determine whether, as
a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements,
increased imports [were] causing or threatening to cause serious injury
to the U.S. industry producing men's and women's leather footwear." 20
The Tariff Commission reported to the President on January 15, 1971.27
The investigation had resulted in an evenly divided Commission. 28 For
a variety of reasons not material to the study, Commissioners Clubb and
Moore had found that the increased imports had resulted in major part
from the trade concessions and that these imports were a major factor in
causing or threatening to cause serious injury to the domestic shoe in-
dustry.29 In consequence, they recommended an increase in the rate of
duty on imported footwear ranging from 10 to 18 percent. 80 On the other
hand, both Presiding Commissioner Sutton and Commissioner Leonard
found in the negative.81 An equally divided Commission finding is the
equivalent of no finding,3 2 and under section 330 of the Tariff Act of
1930, the President is free to choose either as the finding of the Com-
mission. 83
Thus armed with two powerful "persuaders," Ambassador Kennedy
discussed with the Spanish and Italian governments the possibility of self-
limiting arrangements that would avoid the need for restrictive measures
by the United States.34 With him on the trip were Theodore Gates,
Assistant Special Trade Representative, who dealt with the Spanish
authorities, and Donald Webster, an aide to the then White House
Foreign Economic Advisor, Peter G. Peterson, who talked with Italian
authorities.3 5
25. 19 U.S.C. § 1901(b)(1) (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 11, 1962, § 301(b)(1),
76 Stat. 885).
26. Letter from President Richard Nixon to Penelope Sutton, Presiding Commissioner
of the Tariff Commission, in NONRUBBER FooTWE.R, supra note 13, at 2.
27. NoNRUBBER FooTrw.u, supra note 13, at 1.
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 22-23.
30. Id. at 24a.
31. Id. at 25-47.
32. Tariff Act of 1930, § 330, 46 Stat. 696, 19 U.S.C. § 1330(d)(1) (1970).33. Id.; NONRUBBER FoomW'nu, supra note 13, at 3. See note 150 infra and accompany-
ing text.
34. Journal of Commerce, July 9, 1971, at 1, col. 6, and at 17, col. 8. Spain refused to
restrain exports and pointed to its trade deficit with the United States. The UnitedStates was not inclined to press the issue, since renegotiation of the military base agree-
ments for Torrejon and Rota was imminent. Telephone Conversation with Donald
Webster of U.S. Dep't of the Treasury in Washington, D.C., Jan. 10, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as Webster].
35. Telephone Conversation with Theodore Gates of International Business and
Economic Research Corp., in Washington, D.C., Jan. 3, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Gates].
[V9ol. 7: 6
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II
THE AGREEMENT
On July 2, 1971, shortly after the negotiators returned to the United
States, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Trade disseminated a circular to
the local Chambers of Commerce (which are roughly equivalent to the
U.S. Department of Commerce Field Offices) that required Italian ship-
pers of nonrubber footwear to the United States to provide the Italian
government with statistical data on total 1970 and 1971 exports8 6 Once
this information was provided, the shippers would qualify for a "visa,"
issued by the local Chamber of Commerce, permitting further exports.
The text of the circular, in the unofficial translation of the U.S. Embassy
in Rome, read as follows:
As is known, the United States Government has for some time been studying
the possibility of adopting restrictive measures on imports of non-rubber foot-
wear into the United States at the request of the US industry.
Considering the grave consequences which such measures could have on our
exports of shoes, Italy being the most important supplier of the US market,
and the need to obtain as soon as possible information to prepare in advance
appropriate instruments to avoid the possibility of unilateral restrictive mea-
sures by the competent US authorities, this ministry has decided as of July 10,
1971, to make exports of non-rubber footwear to the United States subject to
the presentation to Customs of the Foreign Exchange Certificate (Export Form
A) and invoices, accompanied by a "visa" from the Chamber of Commerce,
Industry, Handicraft and Agriculture having jurisdiction for the area of the
shipper.
On the basis of an understanding with the Ministry of Industry, the Cham-
bers of Commerce will provide these visas, at the request of the interested
shipper, and after affixing the appropriate "visa" on the requested documents,
will retain one copy of the visaed invoice.
The issuance of these visas is subject to presentation of documentation show-
ing the firm's shipments in 1970 and in 1971 up until the time of the first re-
quest for the new statistical visa. Such documentation need be submitted to the
Chamber of Commerce only at the time of the first request for a visa and must
be supported by invoices certified by Customs covering these past shipments.
At the end of each month all Chambers of Commerce will transmit to the
Ministry of Foreign Trade, Director General of Trade Agreements, a report on
all visas issued for the related period, providing the names of firms, their type
of activity--whether industrial or commercial-with the number of pairs of
shoes shipped, showing unit and total value as stated on the documentation.
The Chambers will also transmit to the Ministry all data as reported for
1970 and 1971 exports to the US which have been submitted by these firms in
connection with the first application for a visa.37
The response to the Italian action was swift, but fraught with miscon-
ceptions that went uncorrected for various domestic political reasons. In
the United States it was initially believed that the circular had covered
36. Telegram from Graham Martin, United States Ambassador to Italy, to Secretary of
State William Rogers, July 2, 1971.
37. Id.
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both shoes and textiles;38 indeed, not until ten days after the circular was
released, did the New York Times correct its error8 9 U.S. officials released
the news of the arrangement informally through selected reporters.40 The
impression these officials sought to give was that Italy had undertaken this
step unilaterally.4' Had the arrangement been construed as a bilateral
one certain legal consequences would have followed that the U.S. officials
were anxious to avoid.
The gravest U.S. public misconception concerning the arrangement
centered on what precisely the Italian government had agreed to do.
One commentator declared that "Italy has decided to limit its exports
of textiles and footwear to the United States in answer to alleged threats
from Washington of unilateral restrictive measures." 42 This comment
also alleged that the statistical visas would be authorized only if exports
were held within five percent of the amount exported to the United
States in 1970.43 This of course was precisely the level the Mills Bill
deemed acceptable.
President Nixon and Representative Wilbur D. Mills, Chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee, publicly stated that Italy indeed
had agreed to limit exports. The President was reported to believe "that
[the] Italian Government decision to restrict shoe exports to the United
States may have solved a problem for the American shoe industry and
relieved some of the pressure for Congress to impose limitations.14 4 Fur-
thermore, White House officials said that "Mr. Nixon was delighted with
the Italian decision to hold shoe shipments this year to about their level
of last year." 45
Similarly, at an AFL-CIO conference on jobs, Chairman Mills claimed
that he was responsible in part for "the Italian decision to limit shoe
exports to the United States." 40 He said that at the request of the U.S.
38. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1971, at 31, col. 6. Perhaps the arrangement would have in-
cluded textiles had Italian exports been growing at a rate in excess of five percent an-
nually, which they were not. E(uropean) E(conomic) C(ommunity) Press Release No.
843 (new series), July 6, 1971. Conceivably, the Italian authorities had told Ambassador
Kennedy that textiles would also be monitored, but reconsidered in light of the anti-
cipated domestic outcry. To do so would have been an unnecessary and politically fool-
hardy act, since the rate of expansion was already within acceptable limits. Id.
39. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
40. Gates, supra note 35.
41. Id.; see generally Smith, Voluntary Export Quotas and U.S. Trade Policy-A
New Nontariff Barrier, 5 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 10, 19-21 (1973).
42. N.Y. Times, July 5, 1971, at 31, col. 6.
43. Id.
44. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1971, at 15, col. 1.
45. Id.
46. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1971, at 16, col. 4.
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shoe industry he had discussed the possibility of restraints with Italian
officials, and "informed the Administration that a voluntary restraint
program might be possible." 47
In light of what followed, it is important to note that neither the
President nor Chairman Mills were precise in their announcements. Both
spoke in terms of "limiting shoe exports" without specifying what in fact
would be limited-the number of pairs shipped or their dollar value.
Subsequently, this distinction would prove decisive.48
These public assertions left the Italian Government in a difficult posi-
tion.4 9 On the face of the circular's contents the Italian Government had
only to admit that it was requiring the "statistical visa" to collect data
"to prepare in advance appropriate instruments to avoid the possibility
of unilateral restrictive measures." 50 A public admission of anything more
would have had two serious consequences. First, it would have elicited a
strongly negative domestic response,51 and, second, it would have consti-
tuted a breach of Italy's obligations under the Treaty of Rome.52 Thus,
to avoid the former, Italy repeatedly denied that it had agreed to limit
shoe exports.5 3 The government reportedly criticized the Italian press for
picking up the "voluntary restraints" terminology used by the U.S. news-
papers. 4 Efforts to defuse domestic reaction were aided by the fortuitous
timing of the announcement-at the height of the Italian vacation
period when many critics were out of the capital. 55
To forestall the latter reaction-from the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC)-the Italian Ministry for External Trade assured an EEC
official in Rome that the statistical visa was merely part of a data collect-
ing procedure, and, furthermore, that the visas would be issued "without
limitation."5 6 In addition, the Italian representative to the EEC in Brus-
sels discussed the matter with other member states and claimed "that [the
Italians] are only giving statistical visas for the shoes and it is not tech-
nically a self-limitation." 57 Whatever the nature of the arrangement, said
47. Id.
48. See notes 86-96 infra and accompanying text.
49. Webster, supra note 34. "Our problem was trying to get credit on the home front
for something that Italy was unwilling to admit publicly." Id.
50. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. See notes 109-19 infra and accompanying text.
58. Telegram from the EEC Commission in Brussels to the EEC Information Office,
in Washington, D.C., July 7, 1971 [hereinafter cited as EEC Telegram].
54. Gates, supra note 85.
55. Id.
56. EEC Press Release No. 843 (new series), July 6, 1971.
57. EEC Telegram, supra note 47. The official Italian explanation to the EEC Coin-
1973]
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the EEC officials, "the Italian restraint commitment toward the United
States so far is a moral rather than a binding one .... ,,58
Despite these assurances, the EEC authorities charged with the Com-
munity's common commercial policy9 decided "to watch and wait....
It has to be seen in experience how the statistical visas will work and what
measures, if any, the Community will then have to take."60 The Italian
position before the Community suffered a setback with reports from
Rome that "the Ministry for External Trade [had] 'recommended' foot-
wear exporters to set a 5 percent limit on annual growth in exports to
the American market." 61 The report continued:
Technical circles consider that these various elements confirm that in
principle, the Italian authorities have decided to keep the average increase
of exports to the United States as far as textiles and footwear are concerned
within a limit of 5%. At the American internal level, the administrative de-
partments involved have been asked to draw up monthly reports on the evolu-
ion of imports in these sectors, so that if they exceed the percentage which is
considered acceptable, restrictive measures can rapidly be taken. Thus the
Italian statistical measures aim at obtaining the data needed for a possible
response to American threats: this assuming of course that the 5% rate of
increase is not exceeded .... 62
Because of these contradictory and vague governmental assertions, proof
of the existence and meaning of an arrangement or agreement must be
sought elsewhere. Two sources of information are available-expert
opinions of those who dealt with the matter or who have a continuing
interest in the matter, and official import statistics of the U.S. Department
of Commerce.
III
THE OPINIONS OF THE EXPERTS
Italian commentators claimed that at the time the statistical visa re-
quirement was imposed, exports to the United States had peaked.0 8 They
attributed this occurrence to a sharp rise in manufacturing costs, due
largely to wage increases.0 4 Therefore the fact that the rate of increase
of shoe exports tapered off could be unrelated to the alleged restraints.
Several U.S. commentators share this view and state that Italy, aware
mission in Brussels is contained in a confidential and therefore unpublishable prelimi-
nary memorandum, Protocol No. A/611163, June 26, 1971.
58. Journal of Commerce, July 8, 1971, at 3, col. 2.
59. See note 114 infra and accompanying text.
60. EEC Telegram, supra note 47.
61. EEC Press Release No. 848 (new series), July 6, 1971.
62. Id.
68. Journal of Commerce, July 9, 1971, at 1, 17, col. 8.
64. Id.; Gates, supra note 85; Webster, supra note 84.
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of the changed circumstances of the market, had devised a means of
"papering over the domestic politics of both nations." 65 According to
Donald de Kieffer,66 the Italians, for a variety of reasons besides labor
costs, foresaw the peaking out of exports to the United States. First, they
were aware of a general deterioration of the Italian economy, plagued
with strikes and antiquated corporate management techniques. Second,
they noted the increased competition from Spain and Brazil. And third,
they had to contend with the greatly increased cost of leather-as much
as a 250% increase.67 These facts all tend to support the conclusion that
the subsequent stable level of exports to the United States was not the
result of any agreement to restrain shoe exports.
This conclusion is confirmed by the retrospective observations of Don-
ald Webster, who accompanied Ambassador Kennedy during the Italian
negotiations. 68 He declares forthrightly that the Italian Government
"verbally promised to hold increases in the volume of their shoe exports
to 5 percent." 69 He notes, however, that Italy knew it was "a hollow
promise" at the time, since their shoe industry had encountered serious
difficulties.70 Nonetheless, Mr. Webster asserts that the agreement was
valuable to the United States for domestic political reasons, since it
placated those on Capitol Hill who were calling for quantitative restric-
tions. 71
Similarly, the Information Expert of the EEC's Washington headquar-
ters, Barbara Sloan, also asserts that the EEC initially suspected a mean-
ingful arrangement with the United States, but that this suspicion later
proved unfounded.72 As proof of this assertion, Mrs. Sloan pointed to the
Commission's decision to drop proceedings against Italy for violating the
common commercial policy of the Treaty of Rome.73
65. Gates, supra note 35.
66. Telephone Conversation with Donald E. de Kieffer, Associate with Collier, Shan-
non, Rill and Edwards, in Washington, D.C., Jan. 4, 1973 [hereinafter cited as de
Kieffer].
67. According to Mr. de Kieffer, this increase in the cost of leather was caused by
Argentine tax policies that contributed to the decimation of the Argentine herds. Id.
This increased cost, however, affected only the leather footwear exports of Italy, which
constituted less than fifty percent of Italy's exports. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Notice to
Trade: U.S. Imports of Footwear (Other than Rubber) Including Vinyls, Apr. 1972(printed fact sheet containing official statistics).
68. Webster, supra note 34.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Interview with Barbara Sloan of the EEC Information Office, in Washington,
D.C., Jan. 11, 1973.
73. Id. The Italian Embassy in Washington, D.C., proved a less satisfactory source
of information. On December 28, 1972, when this author inquired of the Embassy's
1973]
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Thus, the opinions of the experts suggest that the Italian Government
perceptively gauged future market trends and offered a meaningless con-
cession to satisfy U.S. officials.74
IV
AN EXAMINATION OF THE STATISTICS
Notwithstanding these opinions, figures compiled by the Department of
Commerce suggest the existence of a meaningful agreement. The volume
of shoe exports from Italy changed drastically after the imposition of the
statistical visa procedures. From this quantitative reduction one might
infer the existence of an arrangement.
In the first six months of 1971, prior to the arrangement, Italy had ex-
ported 52,866,000 pairs of shoes to the United States.75 In the last six
months of 1971, exports amounted to only 24,913,000 pairs.70 As a result
of this precipitous drop, the total quantity of exports declined by more
than 2,570,000 pair--or 3.2 percent-from the 1970 level.77 This decline
followed six years of rapid and substantial expansion. 78 Subsequently, in
1972, the increase in the quantity exported was modest-2.5 percent
greater than in 1971, well within the Mills Bill guidelines. 70
legal advisor, Signor Limarzzi, as to the precise nature of the arrangement, he gave
assurances that Italy had merely instituted an information gathering procedure, nothing
more. On January 4, 1973, however, when this author asked Mr. Vokopula, an Italian
law expert of the European Law Division of the Library of Congress, to make the same
inquiry, on the premise that a United States Senator had requested the information,
the Embassy assured him that Italy had indeed agreed to keep exports within the five
percent Mills Bill guidelines; moreover, continued an unnamed Embassy source, if an
Italian manufacturer refused to provide the requested data on his shipments, the
manufacturer would be denied the necessary export visa.
74. It should be noted, however, that none of these commentators suspected that
U.S. officials knew that the concession was empty at the time but encouraged the fiction
to reap political rewards from the American footwear lobby.
75. U.S. Dep't of Commerce: Industrial Products Division of the Office of Import
Programs, United States Imports of Nonrubber Footwear by Selected Countries 1971,
Dec. 27, 1972 (one of two printed fact sheets containing official statistics for 1971 and
1972) [hereinafter cited as Official Figures 197_...
76. Id. The arrangement alone would not account for this drop. In the late summer
and fall, exports are, in large measure, dress boots and heavier shoes, which are more
expensive and are sold in smaller quantities. In the spring, however, exports are pri.
marily sandals and other lightweight summer footwear, which are sold in greater quan-
tity and are less expensive. This pattern repeated itself in 1972. Id. But in 1970, before
imposition of the monitoring procedure, this seasonal export pattern was noticeably
less pronounced. Id.
77. Id.
78. U.S. Dep't of Commerce: Consumer Products and Services Division of the Bureau
of Domestic Commerce, Notice to Trade: U.S. Imports of Footwear (Other than Rubber)
including Vinyls, Mar. 1968, Apr. 1970, Apr. 1972 (printed fact sheets containing official
statistics).
79. Official Figures 1972, supra note 75.
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Furthermore, an examination of the monthly figures might cause one
to suspect concerted action by Italian manufacturers. Following the cur-
tailed exports in late 1971, the first three months of 1972 witnessed a
dramatic jump to pre-arrangement levels.80 Thereafter, however, the
quantity of exports dropped off sharply and remained low until Decem-
ber. In that month, exports rallied, as if to fill the remaining allotment
under an invisible quota, and ended the year with an increase of 2.5 per-
cent above 1971 totals. The figures for January 1973, indicate that the
cycle has recurred--exports have again jumped sharply with the new
year.8 '
The peculiar pattern of Italian shoe exports is not duplicated by the
export pattern of any other nation. Exports of nonrubber footwear from
Spain remain relatively constant throughout the year, as do those of
Brazil and Taiwan.8 2 Therefore the cyclical pattern of Italian exports
cannot be credited to the forces of market demand peculiar to the foot-
wear industry.8 3
In light of these observations, it is not unreasonable to conclude that
the quantity of shoes exported from Italy to the United States was in fact
and by design kept below the five percent growth level. Arguably, this
limitation could have resulted either from government pressure, direct
or indirect,8 4 or from spontaneous action by the manufacturers, who
realized that their self-interest dictated adherence to the Mills Bill guide-
line.8 5 Whatever the reasons, the export patterns suggest the existence of
some form of arrangement.
V
THE SOLUTION-ITALIAN STYLE
It appears, therefore, that Italy was honoring its "moral obligation" to
restrict exports of nonrubber footwear to the United States. This conclu-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See note 76 supra.
84. Italian Government involvement in the nation's industrial management is exten-
sive and has been described as "incestuous"--the relationship lacks the adversary quality
of United States practice. With such a hand-in-glove relationship, it would be an easy
matter for the Italian Government to inform the corporate boards what precisely it
wanted done, and the industry would then comply. Interview with M. Vokopola, an
Italian law expert with the European Law Division, Library of Congress, in Washington,
D.C., Jan. 4, 1973.
85. Journal of Commerce, July 8, 1971, at 3, col. 2.
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sion, however, proves too pat, for the exact nature of the arrangement
cannot be determined, owing to its confidential nature and conflicting
public explanations.s 6 Neither Chairman Mills nor the President specified
what, in fact, Italy had agreed to limit-the quantity of exports actually
shipped, or the dollar value of the exports.8 7 As it turned out, while
quantitative increases were curtailed, the dollar value continued to climb
at its pre-arrangement rate.88 In 1970, the total value of nonrubber foot-
wear exports totaled $263,880,000; in 1971, it totalled $285,152,000; and
in 1972, it totalled $337,273,000, an increase of 18.2 percent over 1971.8 D
On the one hand, these figures might indicate that Italian manufac-
turers, while continuing to ship the same product mix of footwear they
had exported previously, had raised their prices in response to rising
costs. On the other hand, the figures might indicate that Italian manu-
facturers had changed the type of shoe they were exporting so as to com-
pete in the quality market, relying on superior style and workmanship
to retain their dollar share of the U.S. trade. The latter appears to be
the case.
Spain and Brazil, both of which had been competing with Italy prior
to the arrangement, maintained a more or less direct correlation between
percentage increases in quantity and percentage increases in dollar
value.90 For the first eleven months of 1972, exports from Spain increased
30.2 percent in quantity and 41.5 percent in dollar value. During the
same period, exports from Brazil increased 44.7 percent in quantity and
48.2 percent in dollar value. The vast discrepancies in the figures from
Italy-a 3.0 percent increase in quantity as opposed to a 20.3 percent
increase in dollar value-would indicate that more than higher costs and
dollar devaluation (both of which also affected Spain and Brazil) were
at play.
The irony of this development is that Italian shoes became more di-
rectly competitive with U.S. shoes in the quality market, a market that
U.S. manufacturers had previously dominated.91 In 1970, 60 percent of
86. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
87. Donald Webster, who conducted the negotiations, maintains that the negotiators
were talking only in terms of quantitative restraints, not dollar value. Webster, supra
note 34.
88. Official Figures (1971 & 1972), supra note 75. This development might explain why
the Italian Government went to such great lengths to stress skyrocketing costs. See note
58 supra and accompanying text.
89. Official Figures (1971 & 1972), supra note 75.
90. Id.
91. C(oMrrt) DE L(IAisoN) ET" D'E(TUDE) DE Lr(NDUSTRM) DE LA C(HAUSSURE) DE LA C.E.E.,
REPORT OF THE COORDINATING AND STUDY COMMITrE OF THE FOOTWEAR INDUSTRY FOR
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the Italian exports were of the inexpensive variety;92 in 1972, 96 percent
of the imports were of the high-priced type.93 In 1970, the average F.O.B.
Port of Entry price per imported pair of Italian footwear was $3.28; in
1972, the price had jumped to $4.23, an increase of 29.0 percent.94 During
the same period, the worldwide average price per pair increased by only
21.1 percent.95 This would indicate that the composition of Italian foot-
wear exports had experienced a qualitative transformation.
Thus, by switching in a limited way to the quality line, Italy was able
to substantially increase its dollar sales in the U.S. market while honoring
its moral commitment to the United States to keep quantity in check.
Moreover, by revamping its product mix, Italian industry has reduced
its vulnerability to the quantitative restrictions called for in the Mills
Bill. The feeling that Italy subverted the agreement to its advantage
underlies the renewed calls by American manufacturers for protective
legislation.96
VI
THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE AGREEMENT
The fact that an agreement can only be inferred from the export prac-
tices of the Italian manufacturers subsequent to the implementation of
the statistical visa procedure does not fatally impair its legal significance.
Arguably, the agreement is vulnerable on several counts: (A) it violates
the antitrust provisions of the Treaty of Rome; (B) it runs counter to the
common commercial policy of the EEC; and (C) it violates U.S. antitrust
law. Owing to the nature of the agreement and its susceptability to vary-
ing interpretations, however, attacks on it under any of the preceding
theories will encounter difficulties.
A. TBE ANTnTRUST LAW OF THE EEC
Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome deems incompatible with the Common
Market and thus prohibits:
THE EEC 4-6 (1970), presented before the U.S. Tariff Commission, Investigation No.
TEA-I-18, Oct. 20, 1970.
92. Id. at 6.
93. Telephone conversation with S. Comozzo, Commercial Attach6 of the Italian
Embassy, in Washington, D.C., Feb. 22, 1973.
94. Official Figures 1972 supra note 75.
95. Id.
96. Journal of Commerce, Dec. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 5. Of course, imports from nations
other than Italy have continued to mount quantitatively as well as in dollar value. Id.
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all agreements between undertakings, all decisions by associations of under-
takings and all concerned practices which are liable to affect trade between
Member States and which are designed to prevent, restrict or distort competi-
tion within the Common Market or which have this effect. Particularly pro-
hibited are those consisting in: . . . (b) ... the limitation or control of pro-
duction [and] ... (c) ...market sharing.97
In order to prove that the Italian agreement to limit the export of non-
rubber footwear to the United States constitutes a violation of Article 85,
it would have to be shown that the agreement "affects trade between
Member States." 98
On its face, the agreement appears to affect only trade between Italy
and the United States, and, therefore, to fall outside the Article 85 pro-
hibition. It could reasonably be argued, however, that the agreement in
a limited way does affect the footwear trade between Member States.
The United States represents a steadily increasing market for footwear,
and the EEC footwear manufacturers compete for portions of that mar-
ket.9 9 Thus, by agreeing to severely limit their shares of the increasing
market, the Italian manufacturers in effect present the other EEC manu-
facturers with a windfall-the possibility of increasing their shares free
of the normal forces of Community competition. By thus affording their
EEC competitors easier access to the U.S. market and to greater profits
there, the Italian manufacturers permit their competitors to reduce the
price of footwear in the EEC. In consequence, those non-Italian manu-
facturers would become more competitive in the EEC and would win
part of the previously Italian share of the EEC market. In this way, ar-
guably, the Italian agreement to limit exports "affects trade between
Member States.' 100
Once this interstate effect is established, the Italian manufacturers
could be prosecuted under Article 85. The agreement would constitute
97. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 85, para. 1(b) & (c),
done, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. An unofficial English translation is set forth at 1
CCH Coma . MKr. REP. 2005 (1973).
98. Id. art. 85, para. 1.
99. In 1971, the American nonrubber footwear market was divided as follows, intotal pairs: Italy 77,849,000
France 2,883,000
Germany 2,453,000
United Kingdom 2,827,000
Belgium 181,000
U.S. Dep't of Commerce: Consumer Products and Services Division of the Bureau of
Domestic Commerce, U.S. Imports of Footwear (Other than Rubber) Including Vinyls,
Apr. 1972.
100. Art. 85, para. 1. 1 CCH Comm. MaT. REP. 2005 (1973).
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a concerted practice to limit production and to allocate markets among
the manufacturers. Were there no concerted action, nothing would pre-
vent one Italian manufacturer from exporting more than its alloted share
early in the year; its competitors would then be left with a reduced share
to divide among themselves. As with the agreement itself, a concerted
practice can be inferred by observing the behavior of the actors.101
The Commission of the EEC has recently indicated its intention to
subject to close scrutiny measures relating to the limitation of EEC im-
ports from Japan.102 As the Commission stated:
Lately and increasingly more frequently, cases have been observed where
Japanese industries are preparing measures, partly in an independent capacity,
and partly after concertation with the corresponding European industries,
which are intended to limit imports of Japanese products into the Community
or to regulate them in another way, whether from the point of view of quan-
tities, prices, qualities or in any other respect.
The Commission considers it necessary to draw the attention of those con-
cerned to the fact that by virtue of article 85 paragraph 1 of the Treaty insti-
tuting the European Economic Community, all agreement between firms, all
decisions on associations of firms and all concerted practices capable of affecting
the trade between Member States and which are aimed at, or have the effect
of preventing, restricting or distorting the free workings of competition within
the common market, are incompatible with the common market and pro-
hibited.103
These "orderly marketing agreements," as the Japanese call them, 0 4
bear a close resemblance to the arrangements undertaken by the Italian
manufacturers.
Especially since Chairman Mills claimed to be acting on behalf of the
U.S. footwear manufacturers, 05 the parallels between the two practices
appear that much more striking. As is the case with the division of the
U.S. market by the Italian shoe manufacturers, the Japanese orderly
marketing policy is effected by self-limitation of the exports by the manu-
facturers or by sectoral agreements between the Japanese firms and their
EEC competitors. In the opinion of the European Commission, "sectoral
agreements could be transformed into real market sharing understand-
ings, contrary to the rules of competition.'o 6 Similarly, the agreements
101. Presumably, in light of the official denials issued by the Italian Government,
see note 57 supra, the defense of governmental involvement in the restraints would be
unavailable to the Italian manufacturers. See note 107 infra and accompanying text.
102. EEC Press Release No. 1151 (new series), Oct. 27, 1972.
103. Id.
104. EEC Press Release No. 1184 (new series), Dec. 16, 1972. Europe has a long history
of orderly marketing agreements. See generally Rosen, The Brussels Entente: Export
Combination in the World Steel Market, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1079 (1958).
105. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
106, EEC Press Release No. 1184 (new series), Dec, 16, 1972,
1973]
Cornell International Law Journal
between the Italian manufacturers to divide up among themselves the
existing U.S. market could be construed as market sharing and therefore
contrary to Article 85.
Another consideration affecting an antitrust action is governmental
enforcement of the agreement. 107 The Italian manufacturers could claim
that governmental pressure required them to limit their exports or risk
punitive countermeasures, such as denial of export visas. If such counter-
measures existed, they would serve as a defense in an antitrust action
brought under Article 85.108 In light of both the Italian government's
denial of their existence and the fact that they have never been used
(since exports have been kept within the prescribed limits), proof of their
existence would be difficult and the defense would not be available.
If, however, governmental involvement were shown to exist, or if its
existence were inferred by the apparent compliance of the manufacturers,
the antitrust action would fail. The agreement could in the alternative,
still be attacked on the basis of the EEC common commercial policy.
B. THE COMMON COMmRCIA.L POLICY OF Tm EEC
In addition to their anticompetitive impact, the above limitations on
Japanese imports' 09 also "concealed serious dangers for the trade au-
tonomy of the Community; in fact it goes completely beyond the commu-
nity institutions and makes an important aspect of the import system
depend on autonomous decisions by a third country (or on decisions
between firms).' l10
The trade autonomy referred to above is the objective of the common
commercial policy embodied in Article 113 of the Treaty of Rome."' Un-
der Article 113, the commercial policies of the member states are to be
systematically harmonized until all fundamental aspects of trade between
the EEC and third countries are regulated by the European Commis-
sion. 12 This power relates to negotiations of treaties, negotiations under
GATT, and regulation of common tariffs and export controls."18
107. See note 101 supra.
108. Interview with Dr. I. Zipkov, Deputy Chief of the European Law Division, Library
of Congress, in Washington, D.C., Feb. 17, 1973.
109. See notes 102-106 supra and accompanying text.
110. EEC Press Release No. 1184 (new series), Dec. 16, 1972.
111. Art. 113, 1 CCH Comm. MKT. REP. 3882 (1973).
112. Id.; see generally Everling, Legal Problems of the Common Commercial Policy
in the European Economic Community, 4 Comm. MKT. L. Rzv. 141, 160-64 (1966-67).
113. See Kim, Developments in the Commercial Policy of the European Economic
Community, 8 COMm. MKT. L. REv. 148, 149 (1971).
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Article 113 had been in force since January 1, 1970, i.e., since prior to
the Italian decision to monitor shoe exports. Under Article 113, "the
Community is to replace the member states in their commercial rela-
tions."' 14 To implement Article 113, the Council adopted a regulation" 5
that established the procedures for controlling exports to non-member
countries. The regulation states that EEC exports to third countries can-
not be subject to quantitative restrictions. The only exceptions to this
principle were noted in a "negative list," which included a limited num-
ber of scarce or strategic commodities."16 The regulation also established
the procedures for allowing exceptions to the rule when a Member State
deems immediate action necessary to protect the well-being of its citizens,
but such emergency action must be taken with the consent of the Com-
mission. If undertaken on an emergency basis, the approval of the Com-
mission must be sought immediately thereafter."17
Clearly, the Italian agreement to restrict exports of nonrubber foot-
wear to the United States appears to be a violation of the common com-
mercial policy, since Commission approval was not sought. Indeed, if it
had been sought, it most certainly would have been denied. Moreover,
Italy violated the common commercial policy at the outset by merely
undertaking negotiations with the United States without notifying the
Commission."18 In light of these facts, it is understandable why Italy went
to such great lengths to deny before the Commission that any agreement
had been concluded. Even if the Commission determined that the Italian
government had not involved itself in the arrangement, either in its
negotiation or its enforcement, the Commission could nonetheless infer
a voluntary agreement on the part of the Italian manufacturers and
utilize Article 113 to attack it. That the Italian manufacturers' agree-
ment standing alone, without government involvement, would be viola-
tive of the common commercial policy finds support in a recent
Commission decision regarding voluntary limitations on steel exports.
The Commission is of the opinion that measures of this kind are part of the
commercial policy and that they constitute a field which must continue to be
reserved for the public authorities. The latter have undertaken at the inter-
national level to eliminate trade barriers. It is therefore not desirable for the
private sector, which is not bound by these undertakings, to take measures
114. Id. at 149.
115. Reg. No. 2603/69, 12 E.E.C.J.O., No. 1.324 at 25 (1969).
116. Id. at 29.
117. Dcision du Conseil, 12 E.E.CJ.O., No. L326 at 41 (1969).
118. Id. at 39.
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reserved for the public authorities. Furthermore, before they made their under-
taking, the Commission informed the European steel producers of its position
in this affair.
In the Commission's opinion, measures of this kind should, in the future,
be replaced with the appropriate commercial policy measures.11 0
On this basis, the Commission could attack the arrangement under
Article 113 as violative of the commercial policy, even if the Italian gov-
ernment convinced the Commission of its lack of involvement.
C. THE ANTITRUST LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
An alternate theory on which the arrangement might be attacked would
be under U.S. antitrust laws.1 2 0 Since the export restraints are intended
to have an effect on U.S. commerce, U.S. courts would have jurisdiction
over the subject matter. 12 1 Moreover, the fact that many of the partici-
pating Italian firms are U.S. subsidiaries or derive a large proportion of
capital investment from large, vertically integrated U.S. corporations122
would give U.S. courts in personam jurisdiction.
1. General Observations
Such an action could be brought privately by an injured U.S. importer
or U.S. consumer.las The Clayton Act of 1914124 states that "any person
who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
119. EEC Press Release No. 1167 (new series), Nov. 23, 1972.
120. See Comment, Executive Authority and Antitrust Considerations in "Voluntary"
Limits on Steel Imports, 118 U. PA. L. R.v. 105 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Executive
Authority].
121. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
122. In 1969, about one-third of the 180 million pairs of imported shoes that entered
the United States were manufactured by foreign companies started or backed by Ameri.
can producers. These American concerns, such as the Melville Shoe Corporation, sought
to increase their investments abroad as a protective measure. N.Y. Times, July 3, 1969,
at 39, 44, col. 6. The vertically integrated, United States-based footwear corporations are
therefore rather ambivalent toward the demands of the small manufacturers for pro-
tectionist legislation. Id.
The possible involvement of the American parent with its Italian subsidiary in the
market allocation and production limiting scheme would raise the same problem of
intra-enterprise conspiracy raised in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951). In the Incandescent Lamp case, several European manufacturers, in-
cluding several United States subsidiaries, divided markets and established quotas. Even
though American firms did not participate directly, they were aware of the agreement
and indirectly participated in it through their foreign subsidiaries. United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
123. See Executive Authority, supra note 120. Consumers Union, recently active in
public interest litigation, would seem a likely plaintiff in such a suit.
124. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1971) (Clayton Act, ch. 323 §§ 1-8, 10-16, 26, 38 Stat. 730
(1914) as amended).
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forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor . . ." including, of
course, the prohibitions specified in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890.125 Section 1 of the Sherman Act declares illegal "every contract,
combination.. . or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations .... -126
As noted earlier, the courts would have to infer the existence of the
arrangement among the Italian manufacturers by observation of their
behavior and an examination of the export statistics. This would not be
an insurmountable hurdle. In Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers'
Ass'n v. United States,127 the Supreme Court observed that "It is ele-
mentary... that conspiracies are seldom capable of proof by direct tes-
timony and may be inferred from the things actually done .... "128 The
fact that the quantity of Italian exports to the United States became
relatively static subsequent to the alleged agreement, after an extended
period of rapid expansion, would seemingly constitute sufficiently con-
vincing circumstantial evidence that concerted action had been under-
taken.
Similarly, in personam jurisdiction would not pose a serious problem.
The fact that the manufacturers sell shoes in the United States satisfies
the minimal contacts requirement of International Shoe 129 and enables
the courts to subject the Italian manufacturers to an effective court decree.
2. The Government Action Defense
A more serious hurdle to overcome, however, is the extent of either
government's involvement in the arrangement. U.S. courts, using the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, have exempted from the operation of the
antitrust laws arrangements undertaken at the behest of government
officials.' 3 0 The availability of this defense in an antitrust action brought
by U.S. importers or consumers would depend on the party or parties
against whom the suit was brought.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) as amended).
126. Id.
127. 234 US. 600 (1914).
128. Id. at 612.
129. United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948); International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
130. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). See generally Comment, Governmental
Action and Antitrust Immunity, 119 U. PA. L. Rav. 521 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Governmental Action]; Note, Steel Imports: Congressional Limits on Executive Re-
course to Voluntary Export Restraint Agreements, 4 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 110, 120-23
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Steel Imports].
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Conceivably, the action could be brought against the U.S. corporations
that encouraged Chairman Mills to undertake his ex officio negotiations
with the Italian authorities.' 13 These corporations, however, seem to fall
within the category exempted from antitrust suits by the Noerr-Penning-
ton doctrine. "Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to
influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."'32 Absent a
showing of "further participation [by the U.S. corporations] in the imple-
mentation or enforcement of the action.., conduct beyond mere solici-
tation," the doctrine would shield the U.S. corporations. 3 3 None of the
officials or experts mentioned above suggested that the U.S. corporations
sought in any way to pressure the government to enforce the arrange-
ment. However, since the Italian manufacturers remained within the
arrangement guidelines, this is not significant.
If, however, the suit were brought against the Italian corporations and
the U.S. corporations whose subsidiaries or branches participated in the
"voluntary" export restraint, exemption under the Noerr-Pennington
defense would be less certain. Availability of the defense would turn on
the nature and extent of U.S. Government and Italian Government in-
volvement in the arrangement 8 4 Arguably, the Noerr-Pennington de-
fense extends to all arrangements in which government officials take an
active part. 35
a. The Role of the U.S. Government
Since both President Nixon and Chairman Mills actively sought the
voluntary restraints, and since both claimed credit for their imposition
subsequent to the Italian Government's promulgation of the statistical
visa procedures, 8 6 establishing government action should not prove dif-
ficult. However, as in the case of the voluntary restraints on steel imports,
unless the governmental action is valid it will not serve as a Noerr-
Pennington shield in an antitrust action.137
131. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
132. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 881 U.S. 657, 670 (1965).
133. Steel Imports, supra note 130, at 123.
134. The subsequent discussion concerning United States governmental action as an
antitrust defense relies heavily on the reasoning of Steel Imports, supra note 130.
135. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943); Hecht v. Pro Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931(D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Steel Imports, supra note 130; see generally Governmental
Action, supra note 130. On occasion, however, the courts have not permitted the de-
fense. United States v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Ass'n, 389 U.S. 27 (1967); United
States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967).
136. See notes 44-47 supra and accompanying text.
137. See Steel Imports, supra note 130, at 123. "[T]he instant case involve[s] state
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In examining the validity of the arrangement, U.S. courts would focus
on whether or not:
the President had the actual authority under the Constitution to conclude such
an agreement. The courts realize that to give effect to an agreement concluded
pursuant to the President's apparent authority, rather than his actual au-
thority, would completely remove the conduct of foreign affairs from the con-
stitutional safeguard of a system of checks and balances and would jeopardize
constitutional guarantees of rights and liberties .... Clandestine executive
action in this area should not lightly be allowed to replace the public scrutiny
of congressional deliberation or the procedural safeguards of administrative
hearings.138
Congressional involvement in the Italian arrangement in the person of
Chairman Mills would not mitigate the threat to the constitutional
scheme of checks and balances posed by the arrangement. Mere participa-
tion by a lone, albeit powerful, congressman cannot constitute partici-
pation by the entire body. The only public aspects of the episode were
the Tariff Commission hearings and the hearings on the Trade Act of
1970, which established the fact that increased imports had injured the
U.S. footwear industry.189 All other aspects were surrounded by secrecy;
even the result was never announced forthrightly. Those who would
suffer as a result of the arrangement-importers and consumers-had no
chance to mount an attack on it or to influence the outcome. 140
Had the Mills Bill been enacted into law, arguably such a congressional
approval of the agreement's terms would have constituted prior con-
gressional authorization for presidential action, as required in B. Altman
& Co. v. United States.14 ' This is especially true since the bill had author-
ized the President to negotiate arrangements aimed at self-limitation of
exports and had specified five percent as the desirable maximum rise in
export levels.'4 Such a safeguard against executive caprice, however, is
lacking in the Italian footwear arrangement, since Congress never passed
such legislation to indicate its intent. Thus it can neither be argued that
the President acted pursuant to real authority delegated to him by Con-
gress, nor that he subsequently attempted to secure congressional ap-
proval of the arrangement.
participation. That proposition however, only begins the analysis, for it is not every
governmental act that points a path to an antitrust shelter." Woods Exploration &
Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1294 (5th Cir. 1971).
138. Steel Imports, supra note 180, at 125. See Reid v. Covert, 845 U.S. 1 (1957);
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1955); J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 894 (1928).
189. See notes 12-31 supra and accompanying text.
140. For an analysis of the substantive and procedural components of actual au-
thority to conclude such an arrangement, see Steel Imports, supra note 180, at 125.
141. 224 U.S. 588 (1912).
142. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
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Since the President acted without such delegation from Congress, he
must have relied on his inherent foreign affairs powers to justify his
recourse to such an extraordinary remedy. It has been pointed out, how-
ever, that "with regard to the validity of action based solely on the Presi-
dent's powers, the courts have inquired into whether the Constitution
also grants Congress power over the particular subject and, if so, whether
Congress has exercised this power."'148 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit made that inquiry in United States v. Guy W. Capps,
InC. 44 and found both the constitutional grant of the power to Con-
gress' 45 and incidences of its exercise.146 The court determined that "the
executive agreement was void because it was not authorized by Congress
and contravened provisions of a statute dealing with the very matter to
which it related."' 47
Therefore, if such a statute could be shown to exist it would follow
that the agreement was void and the Noerr-Pennington defense of gov-
ernment participation unavailable to the participating firms. Clearly,
the Italian arrangement involved foreign commerce, the regulation of
which the Constitution grants to Congress.148 Moreover, Congress on
numerous occasions had exercised this authority, most recently in the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962.149 In that legislation, Congress explicitly
established the procedure the President was to follow when U.S. industry
complains of injury from increased imports. 50 He can, among other
143. Steel Imports, supra note 130, at 182-33.
144. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
145. "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign nations
U. " .S. CONSr. art. I, § 8.
146. The Agricultural Act of 1948, ch. 827, 62 Stat. 1247 (codified in scattered sections
of 7, 15, 18 U.S.C.).
147. 204 F.2d at 659. The court continued:
We think that whatever the power of the executive with respect to making
executive trade agreements regulating foreign commerce in the absence of ac-
tion by Congress, it is clear that the executive may not through entering into
such an agreement avoid complying with a regulation prescribed by Congress.
Imports from a foreign country are foreign commerce subject to regulation,
so far as this country is concerned, by Congress alone. The executive may not
bypass congressional limitations regulating such commerce by entering into an
agreement with the foreign country that the regulation be exercised by that
country through its control over exports. Even though the regulation prescribed
by the executive agreement be more desirable than that prescribed by Con-
gressional action, it is the latter which must be accepted as the expression of
national policy.
Id. at 659-60.
148. U.S. CONSr., art. I, §§ 8, 10.
149. 76 Stat. 872 (codified in scattered sections of 19, 26 U.S.C.).
150. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 351(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(1) (1970) (originally
enacted as Act of Oct. 11, 1962, § 352(a), 76 Stat. 872).
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things, act pursuant to an affirmative finding by the Tariff Commission of
import related injury and impose higher duties,151 or he can negotiate
a limitation agreement with the country whose imports are alleged to be
injuring the U.S. industry. 5 2
Before taking such action, however, the President must comply with
elaborate procedural safeguards to assure that all interested parties have
the opportunity to make known their views.'53 Even though the President
complied with the procedures in requesting the Tariff Commission in-
vestigation, 54 and was free to negotiate an agreement with Italy' 55 as a
result of the equally divided Commission, 5 6 he failed to publicly declare
his intention, failed to act within the statutorily required sixty days, 57
and failed to explain his inaction to Congress.158 Although it is dear
that he did negotiate and did in fact coordinate his actions with Congress
through Chairman Mills, such action was taken sub rosa, rendering mean-
ingless the explicit procedural protection against executive whim.
Thus failing to adhere to the statutory requirements, the President,
acting through his special ambassador, acted ultra vires, and the agree-
ment is invalid. Therefore, as far as U.S. governmental action is con-
cerned, the Noerr-Pennington defense is unavailable to either the Italian
companies or the U.S. corporations whose subsidiaries or branches par-
ticipated in the market sharing arrangement.
b. The Role of the Italian Government
The nature and extent of Italian Government involvement, however,
casts the private U.S. antitrust action against the Italian corporations and
the U.S. subsidiaries in an entirely different light. U.S. antitrust law per-
mits several absolute defenses to charges of anticompetitive restrictions
in foreign commerce. 59 For example, it has been suggested that firms may
engage in such practices if required to do so by "foreign law and govern-
mental regulation."' 06
151. See notes 29-50 supra and accompanying text.
152. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 352(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1982(a) (1970).
153. See Steel Imports, supra note 130, at notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
154. See note 26 supra.
155. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1982(a) (1970) (originally enacted as
Act of Oct. 11, 1962, § 352(a), 76 Stat. 872).
156. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
157. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(2)(A) (1970) (originally enacted
as Act of Oct. 11, 1962 § 351(a)(2)(A), 76 Stat. 872).
158. Id.
159. See generally S. OPPENHOEI &. G. NasroR, FmERAL. ANrrrRusr Lw 777 (1968).
160. Id.
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In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 61 the Supreme Court
noted that the acts complained of included anticompetitive interference
by the Costa Rican government, but held that the Sherman Act did not
reach restraints legal in the country where they were committed, parti-
cularly when required by the host government. 6 2 Although this holding
was later narrowed, 63 the portion that exempts from the reach of the
Sherman Act those restraints imposed at the insistence of the host gov-
ernment remains intact, even when those acts have an effect on U.S.
commerce. 64 Thus, if it were shown or if it were inferred that the par-
ticipating firms acted pursuant to an Italian Government directive, U.S.
antitrust laws would not reach the firms or the restrictive acts. Were it
otherwise, U.S. antitrust laws could prevent trade with all state-trading
nations, an effect Congress certainly cannot have intended in enacting the
antitrust laws.
Presumably, U.S. courts could inquire into the validity of the Italian
directive, under Italian and EEC law, just as they could examine the
validity of the Presidential negotiation under U.S. law.0 5 As shown
above, the Italian authorities violated the laws of the EEC and could
therefore be shown to have acted ultra vires, voiding the Noerr-Penning-
ton defense. The extension of this inquiry to foreign acts of state seems
unlikely, however, given the traditional adherence of U.S. courts to the
act of state doctrine. 66 Hence, the Noerr-Pennington defense of govern-
mental action will survive this attack.
On the other hand, absent a showing of Italian Government participa-
tion by fact or inference, the government action defense could not avail
the Italian corporations and the U.S. subsidiaries that participated in the
self-limiting arrangement. These firms would be subject to prosecution,
since the arrangement affected U.S. commerce. 6 7 On its face, a successful
161. 213 U.S. 347 (1909); see also United States v. United Fruit Co., 4 TRADE REG. REP.
(1958 Trade Cases) 68,941, at 73,790 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1958).
162. 213 U.S. at 357.
163. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
164. S. OPPENEIM & G. NEsrOR, supra note 159. See also W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COM-
MmRmE AND ANTrnusr LAws 29-52 (1958); Opinion re Potash Mined in Germany, 31 OP.
ATTY. GEN. 545 (1916-1919). A German law had required anticompetitive conduct, and
conduct pursuant to the law was beyond the reach of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 553.
165. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
166. U.S. courts will not examine the validity of the official acts of foreign sovereigns,
except in rare circumstances. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964).
167. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The court
found the Sherman Act applicable to an agreement setting export quotas negotiated in
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prosecution appears possible. "[C]ertain conduct may, in foreign as in
domestic commerce, be more quickly adjudged illegal. Agreements among
competitors to... control production are conclusively presumed to be
illegal."1 68
CONCLUSION
The President and Congress must finally acknowledge that the short
term gains achieved by clandestine negotiations-the avoidance of both
divisive political debate and possibly retrogressive legislation-will prove
fleeting, and the long term losses dear. Such arrangements serve as a source
of resentment to the "self-limiting" nation that could poison the spirit
of cooperation and goodwill that has marked postwar trade negotiations.
Furthermore, they subvert constitutionally and legislatively established
procedures and foster government by dispensation rather than by law.
The courts, to safeguard the substantive and procedural rights of U.S.
consumers, importers, and retailers, must void such secret agreements and
force public debate and forthright public resolution.16 9 Moreover, Con-
gress, in redrafting the Trade Reform Act of 1973, must endeavor to
bridle executive discretion by expressly prohibiting deceptive negotiations
of the variety that produced the limitation on Italian shoe exports. As
Justice Brandeis observed, "Sunshine is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants."170
Switzerland by foreign corporations. "[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon per-
sons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends .. ." (citations omitted). Id. at 443. From
the import figures referred to in notes 75-76 supra, it can be inferred that the arrange-
ment substantially affected US. imports. This finding would satisfy subject matter juris-
diction requirements.
168. S. OPrENHEIM & G. NESrOR, supra note 159, at 777, quoting the Report of the
Attorney General's Antitrust Committee 80-81, 83 (1955).
169. Consumers Union has recently brought suit under the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), and Executive Order 11,671 3 C.F.R. 187 (Supp. 3A 1972), and
the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770 (1972), to require
the Department of Commerce to make available information relating to the secretly
negotiated textile agreements. See Brief for Plaintiff at 1-2, Consumers Union of United
States, Inc. v. Peterson (D.D.C. 1973). See also Washington Evening Star and News, Jan.
25, 1973, at 18, col. 1.
170. L. BRANDEIs, OmTE PEOPLE'S MONEY ch. 5 (1914), quoted in L. Loss, SEcuarrEs
REGULATION 77 (1951).
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